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By Judith Rowland. New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1985. Pp. xiii, 353. $17.95.

THE ULTIMATE VIOLATION.

As an assistant deputy with the San Diego District Attorney's Office, Judith Rowland pioneered a new approach to the prosecution of
rape cases. By offering expert testimony which focused upon the perceptions, prevention strategies, and coping behaviors of rape victims,
Rowland sought to dispel the myths and misconceptions whi9h so
often prevented convictions in cases where the defendant claimed consent. The Ultimate Violation is Rowland's chronicle of the history of
four rape cases on which she worked between 1978 and 1980.
The book is a brisk narrative account of Rowland's experiences in
the district attorney's office. "In an effort to reach the broadest possible audience - potential jurors, law enforcement personnel, the nation's prosecutors and judges, even mental health professionals, and,
certainly, future and past victims" (p. vii) - Rowland uses a simple
prose style, much as if she were addressing a jury. Relying to a large
extent on office interviews and trial testimony (interposed with her
commentary), Rowland artfully describes her clients, their cases, and
their lives.
To convict a defendant of rape in California, Rowland had to
prove that the victim had resisted the attack. 1 This requirement led to
a horrifying paradox: while resistance is most easily proved by the
physical scars of the victim and the attacker, most literature on rape
avoidance and survival counseled women against the use of physical
force (pp. 24-25). As one victim told Rowland: "[E]verything I did
right to save my life, those things, you know, in the articles and films,
all of that is exactly wrong in terms of proving I am telling the truth"
(p. 19). Faced with this dilemma, Rowland sought to present direct
evidence to enhance victim credibility, including expert testimony regarding rape prevention strategies and the coping behavior of victims.
Initially, Rowland presented this testimony based upon its relevance to the preliminary question of resistance. She hoped this evidence would aid the jury "in reaching their decision about whether
[the victim] resisted or why she had chosen not to" (p. 25). Since the
district attorney's office would provide no money for an academic expert, Rowland chose an officer with the sex crimes unit of the San
Diego police force. The officer testified in three cases, two of which
seemed "untriable" to other deputies in her office and one of which
1. P. 25. While the California courts held that the victim need only resist with as much effort
and for as long as she perceived it to be of any use, Rowland claims that "history had taught us
that the victim must really resist for as long as the jurors felt she should." P. 25 (emphasis in the
original). The California legislature abandoned the resistance requirement for rapes prosecuted
after January 1, 1981. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 261(2) (West Supp. 1987).
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had previously resulted in a hung jury. The officer's testimony addressed the behavior of rape victims in order to educate the jurors and
to clear up common misconceptions which make prosecution so difficult. First, she explained that most rapes occurred between casual acquaintances rather than strangers. Second, she described the
prevention and self-defense guidelines taught to women: those techniques suggested for avoiding, recognizing, and defending against a
sexual assault. Finally, she assessed and defended the reasonableness
of each victim's response to being attacked, emphasizing that these
women faced situations in which they feared for their lives.
Rowland won convictions in each of the three cases in which the
expert testified; however, she was not successful on appeal. The reviewing courts found this "educational" testimony irrelevant. One
court noted:
How these interesting observations and experiences of the officer would
tend to prove or disprove there was forcible rape of Terri R. is not clear.
The rape of Terri is not to be determined by statistics or by a popular
survey of what victims in other rape scenes do or do not do. [p. 211]

Nevertheless, two of the appellate courts affirmed the convictions,2
finding the erroneous admission of expert testimony harmless since it
had "no 'probative value' " and did not " 'disturb the jury's evaluation
process'" (p. 210). Interviews with the jurors in these cases clearly
showed the contrary (pp. 115-16, 130, 204).
Undaunted, Rowland developed an alternative theory. Acknowledging the "tricks" of advocacy, she confesses that she had previously
"use[d] resistance as an excuse to get in expert testimony while its real
purpose was a psychological one to challenge defense credibility in the
jurors' minds" (pp. 218-19). Taking a more direct approach, she decided to offer the testimony to support victim credibility and help the
jury distinguish between a reasonable and unreasonable mistake as to
consent (pp. 218-19). 3 In her final, and seemingly "untriable," case
with the district attorney's office, Rowland presented the testimony of
Dr. Joshua Golden, a professor of psychology at the UCLA School of
Medicine. Dr. Golden, well-versed in the field of rape victimization,
described the standard behavior patterns of rape victims and the disorder known as "rape trauma syndrome."4 He also informed the jury
2. Sadly, as was the trend in California, these rapists were sentenced to serve short jail terms.
Pp. 116, 204. Since January 1, 1980, all rape convictions in California require a prison sentence.
P. 205.
3. Aside from the appellate decisions, the California legislature rendered the resistance the·
ory obsolete. As of January 1, 1981, resistance was deleted from the definition of rape. See note
1 supra. The new law made consent, or lack of consent, the only issue for the jury to determine
concerning victim behavior. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West Supp. 1987). Previous decisions
held that, to be convicted, the defendant had to be at least negligent with regard to consent, thus
paving the way to a reasonable mistake as to consent defense. People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d
143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975).
4. Rape, like other potentially life-threatening events, often produces behavioral, somatic,
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that, after interviewing the victim, he was certain she suffered from
this syndrome. The trial ended in a hung jury, with only two members
voting not guilty.

***

Although The Ultimate Violation provides a fascinating behindthe-scenes look into the prosecution of four rape cases, it is subject to
criticism on a few fronts. Due in part to Rowland's attempt to reach
such a large audience, the work may not fully satisfy the legal scholar.
The book is long on opinion and short on analysis. Rowland expresses
confidence that her legal theories and technique are "right" (pp. 26,
208-11); unfortunately, she provides little information with which the
reader might evaluate her arguments. 5 She is certain that expert testimony was properly admissible, but never sets out the provisions of the
California Evidence Code which she relied upon to "carry off this
coup." 6 The reader is left wanting to know more, but with little guidance where to turn.
Furthermore, Rowland's self-aggrandizing stance throws into
question the accuracy of these histories. She bills herself as the ultimate prosecutor - a woman who can write a crucial trial memo in
fifteen minutes (p. 34), determine the reliability of a rape claim in ten
minutes (p. 140), and ascertain the deepest prejudices of any juror (pp.
52, 350-51). More practically, one wonders how she can quote accurately from meetings and interviews which occurred five years prior to
the writing of this book.
These problems, however, do not detract greatly from what is, for
the most part, an absorbing (and empassioned) analysis of the law of
and psychological reactions on the part of the victim. The pattern of typical responses to this
event is termed "rape trauma syndrome." In its initial phase, the victim may become emotionally unbalanced and feel guilty, wondering what she had done to deserve the attack. After that
disorganization phase, the victim will consciously deny the event occurred and may avoid all
circumstances reminiscent of the rape, particularly sexual experiences and the geographic area in
which the rape occurred. Pp. 336-42. See generally Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974).
5. Rowland provides almost no legal support for the arguments she does make. She mentions only a few cases in the entire book (referring to one as "the Morgan case") and then she
gives no case citations. Pp. 214, 217, 352. Similarly, she relies on, and quotes from, a few scholarly articles and research studies, but provides little or no bibliographic information. Pp. 27, 213,
283. Rowland's analysis relies heavily on Bienen, Rape III - National Developments in Rape
Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 170 (1980); Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 4;
A. GROTH & H. BIRNBAUM, MEN WHO RAPE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE OFFENDER (1979).
6. P. 21. For thorough analyses of the admissibility of expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome to rebut defendant's consent defense, compare Ross, The Overlooked Expert in Rape
Prosecution, 14 U. ToL. L. REv. 707, 723 (1983) (arguing that a "qualified psychologist, psychiatrist, or other competent expert should be allowed to testify to a diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome when the symptomatology is present"), with Note, Checking the Allure of Increased
Conviction Rates: The Admissibility ofExpert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal
Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1705 (1984) (concluding that the "reliability problems with
the rape victim literature and the difficulty of inferring the defendant's mens rea from the alleged
victim's emotional state" weigh against admissibility). See generally Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977).

1264

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:1261

rape. At its core, The Ultimate Violation is an insightful feminist critique of the legal profession and the criminal justice system; a system
that is dominated by men, and one in which rights, responsibilities,
duties, and privileges are defined to meet the needs of men (p. xi).
Throughout the book, Rowland argues that her gender permits her to
evaluate, understand, and respond to life experiences from a new vantage point - a "woman's perspective" (pp. xi, 4, 28, 304). This assertion, reminiscent of other feminist arguments grounded upon the work
of Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan,7 is particularly compelling in
an area where women have a special status as victims.
Traditionally, the law has protected men from rape convictions
through the use of cautionary instructions, corroborative requirements, proof of resistance to establish nonconsent, and the introduction of past sexual history of victims. 8 Professor Susan Estrich notes:
"In rape, the male standard defines a crime committed against women,
and male standards are used not only to judge men, but also to judge
the conduct of women victims." 9 This bias had contributed to the
much-documented abuse of rape victims by defense attorneys. 10 In
addition, prosecutors may perpetuate similar, although more subtle,
abuses. Rowland's supervisor once suggested that she dismiss a case
because the victim lived and slept with a male roommate in Ocean
Beach (a "bohemian" neighborhood), had herpes, and kept her door
unlocked (p. 6). Contrary to her associates, Rowland rarely dismissed
a case if the victim was" 'flaky,' 'loose,' [or] 'dingy'" (p. 3). Her sensitivity to the plight of rape victims is praiseworthy. Her interviews
and trial examinations, delicately handled but remarkably thorough,
deserve careful reading.
7. N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SO·
CIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). For an excellent overview of these arguments, see
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543,
580-91 (1986). See also Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Scales, The Emer·
gence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
8. Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1090-91 (1986).
9. Id. at 1091. Professor Estrich, in words similar to those of Rowland's victims, begins her
article by describing her experience as a rape victim. She then goes on to provide an illuminating
examination of the Jaw of rape. She argues:
[In cases where less than extreme] force is used or no other physical injury is inflicted, where
threats are inarticulate, where the two know each other, where the setting is not an alley but
a bedroom, .•. where the woman says no but does not fight, ..• the law, as reflected in the
opinions of the courts, the interpretation, if not the words, of the statutes, and the decisions
of those within the criminal justice system, often tell us that no crime has taken place and
that fault, if any is to be recognized, belongs with the woman. In concluding that such acts
•.. are not criminal, and worse, that the woman must bear any guilt, the law has reflected,
legitimized, and enforced a view of sex and women which celebrates male aggressiveness and
punishes female passivity.
Id. at 1092.
10. See generally s. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE
(1975); J. & H. SCHWENDINGER, RAPE AND INEQUALITY (1983); Note, The Victim in a Forcible
Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335 (1973).
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Such sensitivity is crucial because, in striking contrast to other
crimes, rape cases focus the court's attention upon the appropriateness
of the victim's behavior. As a "victim's advocate" (p. 84), Rowland
used expert testimony as a tool to educate jurors and to shift the
boundaries between consensual and nonconsensual sex. Paying tribute
to her success, one trial judge, when ruling on the admissibility of the
expert's testimony, noted:
I do not think what I have heard in this courtroom today can be viewed
as generally known by the public. . . . This information is important,
and relevant for jurors to understand. It puts a whole new perspective
on the behavior of women in these situations. [p. 49]

It is startling and disheartening that the California appellate courts
found the expert testimony both irrelevant and non-prejudicial. II
Although rejected by the courts, new legal theories, such as Rowland's, may serve an important educational function. These arguments, and the debate they engender, force us to re-evaluate our laws
and our prejudices. Another area in which a feminist critique has been
instructive, but unpalatable to the courts, is that of pornography. In
April 1984, Indianapolis enacted an ordinance, principally drafted by
Catherine MacK.innon and Andrea Dworkin, which defined pornography as "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women...."I 2
This ordinance empowered women to bring a civil rights action
against the makers and sellers of pornography. I3 The Seventh Circuit,
in an opinon written by Judge Easterbrook, struck down the statute on
first amendment grounds;I 4 nevertheless, this initiative set off an intense debate about pornography, gender discrimination, and the first
amendment. Is As one commentator noted, it "involved the courts in
11. Pp. 209-10. Since Rowland left the district attorney's office, the highest courts in four
states have addressed the issue of expert testimony to prove rape trauma syndrome. These courts
have split on the issue of admissibility. Compare State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d
1292, 1299 (1982) (expert testimony admissible), with State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 236-42
(Mo. 1984) (expert testimony inadmissible), and State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230-31
(Minn. 1982) (expert testimony inadmissible). For an intermediate position, see People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 246-49, 681 P.2d 291, 298-99, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457-58 (1984) (expert
testimony inadmissible to prove rape, but admissible to rebut inferences a jury might draw with
respect to alleged victim's behavior following the rape). Rowland misreads Bledsoe as a total ban
of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome. Pp. 352-53.
12. INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CoDE § 16-3(q) (1984).
13. INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CoDE § 16-17(b)(l984).
14. American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), ajfd., 106 S. Ct.
1172 (1986).
15. For a defense of this approach to pornography, see MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985). See also, Clark, Liberalism and
Pornography, in PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP 45, 52-57 (D. Copp & s. Wendell eds. 1983);
A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981). For criticisms of this approach, see, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae prepared by Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force,
American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), ajfd., 106 S. Ct. 1172
(1986). See genera//y, Symposium - Pornography, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1987)
(forthcoming).
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exactly the sort of public discourse which is vital to society." 16 As an
author, Rowland hopes to continue a "process of education and enlightenment for men and women everywhere on a subject so long
cloaked in myth and misunderstanding" (p. vii). On this score, The
Ultimate Violation should be applauded; it compels the reader to reevaluate the biases and implications of our rape laws and the treatment of sexual assault victims.
-

16. Scales, supra note 7, at 1373 n.2.

Todd Maybrown

